First, the main proponents of sense-datum theories advanced these theories mainly as theories of exteroception, that is, perception of external physical reality.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

They have exteroception in mind, and we'll use the term always in this sense.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

Again compare the subjectivity of pains to the ˜objectivity™ of the objects of standard exteroception.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

Standard perception (exteroception) can be analyzed as involving the perception (act) of a public object.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

Let's call this exteroception, to contrast with introspection which is access to one's intra-mental activity.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

According to sense-datum theorists, however, we are rarely, if ever, aware of this indirection in ordinary (veridical) exteroception.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

Second, when applied to standard exteroception, sense-datum theories don't seem to support the perceptual direct (naíve) realism of common sense at all.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

Whatever the fate of sense-datum theories might be as general theories of exteroception, their appeal as a model for understanding pains and other intransitive bodily sensations is very strong.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

Our spontaneous conceptual reaction also follows this pattern: there is a marked difference in the locus of concept application or conceptual identification between standard exteroception and pain.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

In apparent contrast to pain, normal exteroception always involves the possibility of misperception, and thus miscategorization (that is, misapplication of concepts to the objects of exteroception).    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

Whatever merits sense-datum theories might have with respect to genuine perception (exteroception) and misperception, its attraction seems undeniable when it comes to its treatment of pains and other.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

As a matter of fact, our conceptual practices treat seeing and other standard exteroception differently than they treat feeling pain, despite the fact that the types of information flow seem identical in both cases.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

So even if one finds the anti-sense-datum arguments convincing and rejects indirect realism of this kind for standard exteroception, there is still room for adopting a sense-datum theory for intransitive bodily sensations and for pain in particular.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

Furthermore, if one is not a perceptualist, one doesn't have an obligation to deal with what we'll call below the problem of focus, the problem of explaining why there is an asymmetry in conceptual focus between pain and standard exteroception if both are genuinely perceptual.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

In short, although sense-datum theories that are explicitly advanced as theories of perception (exteroception) don't generate much conviction, they seem to be more convincing when applied to intransitive bodily sensations like pains that are not usually thought to be perceptual.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

Because sense-datum theories are most plausible when applied to intransitive bodily sensations, many philosophers, who believe that a naturalist account of ordinary perception can be given without introducing sense-data, have attempted to understand pains and other bodily sensations as species of ordinary perception (exteroception).    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

However, the perceptual theorist can still claim that whatever the explanation might be in the case of other intransitive bodily sensations, the explanation offered for pain is essentially correct, and such a theorist may thus conclude that she has discharged the burden of proof in claiming that experiencing pain is engaging in genuine exteroception.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

This difficulty arises because the mark of any (early) direct realism in the theory of perception is the repudiation of consciously available perceptual intermediaries that mediate standard exteroception: when I see a red apple on the table, there is no object or quality distinct from the apple and its redness such that I see the apple in virtue of seeing it (or more generally, in virtue of directly perceiving or being aware of it).    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

If perception is a psychological process by which we gather information about the extramental world and align our conceptual and behavioral responses on this basis in a certain way, it is a fair question to ask whether a psychological process that deviates from this is perception, especially when the deviation seems to reflect that our epistemic needs and psychological preferences are markedly different than those involved in exteroception.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

But it wasn't to be as he suffered at the plate and suffered injuries, including exteroception problems that has either ended his career or put it on hold.    From Wordnik.com.  [xml's Blinklist.com] Reference

But, at least in standard exteroception, these qualities contingently represent objective sensible properties of public objects in virtue of either resembling them or by being regularly caused by their instantiations ” or both.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

It involves exteroception.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference