There are always the quotient structures (Quine 1963). From Wordnik.com. [Relative Identity] Reference
Quine, Willard van Orman (1953): “On What There Is”. From Wordnik.com. [Nonexistent Objects] Reference
In those logics that stand in the Frege-Quine tradition, both. From Wordnik.com. [Nonexistent Objects] Reference
Quine famously called for a return to psychologism in the 1960s. From Wordnik.com. [Psychologism] Reference
Some important Bolzanian ideas are also found in the work of Quine. From Wordnik.com. [Bolzano's Logic] Reference
Quine does not give an explicit criteria for determining when a term. From Wordnik.com. [Sortals] Reference
˜On what there is™, Review of Metaphysics; reprinted in Quine 1980. From Wordnik.com. [Logic and Ontology] Reference
Like Quine, Sellars was deeply influenced by the work of Rudolf Carnap. From Wordnik.com. [Wilfrid Sellars] Reference
Wiggins (1967, 1980, 2001) took a line in opposition to both Geach and Quine. From Wordnik.com. [Sortals] Reference
For later stages in the debate between Quine and Geach, see Noonan 2004, Section 3. From Wordnik.com. [Sortals] Reference
Compare topiary, making use of an analogy exploited by Quine in a different connection. From Wordnik.com. [The Identity Theory of Mind] Reference
The tradition that began with Locke and Hume continued through Russell and down to Quine. From Wordnik.com. [The Passing of Willard Van Orman Quine] Reference
Quine, W. V (1981), “Things and their places in theories” in his Theories and Things. From Wordnik.com. [Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics] Reference
For more discussion of logic with an empty domain see (Quine 1954) and (Williamson 1999). From Wordnik.com. [Logic and Ontology] Reference
The man is far more likely to be searched for under "Quine" alone than the computer program.). From Wordnik.com. [Citizendium, the Citizens' Compendium - Recent changes [en]] Reference
Quine also held that decisions about how to make such associations should be made holistically. From Wordnik.com. [Logical Form] Reference
Quine made a very simple observation that has had far-reaching consequences for the old debate. From Wordnik.com. [Metaphysics] Reference
The argument leading to this conclusion was developed in a series of well-known papers by Quine. From Wordnik.com. [Psychologism] Reference
Quine, W. (1956/76), “Carnap and Logical Truth,” in his Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, 2nd ed. From Wordnik.com. [The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction] Reference
In footnote 1 of Quine 1960, p. 90 he says that his expression is equivalent to Strawson's ˜sortal™. From Wordnik.com. [Sortals] Reference
Quine, Willard Van Orman (1941) "Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic," in Schilpp, Paul Arthur (ed.). From Wordnik.com. [Alfred North Whitehead] Reference
Shifting to the quotient structures, as Quine suggested, does not induce a "baroque, Meinongian ontology". From Wordnik.com. [Relative Identity] Reference
Most of us do regard them to be synonymous; Quine denied that there was any such thing as synonymy itself!. From Wordnik.com. [The Passing of Willard Van Orman Quine] Reference
Philosophical Papers vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, pp. Quine, W.V. (1955), “Posits and Reality”, repr. in. From Wordnik.com. [Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics] Reference
According to Quine, modality attaches to statements and ways of referring to entities, and not to things in themselves. From Wordnik.com. [The Epistemology of Modality] Reference
See (Yablo 1998) for more on the debate between Quine and Carnap, which contains many references to the relevant passages. From Wordnik.com. [Logic and Ontology] Reference
The closest Quine comes to an explicit formulation of a characterization is in contrasting indivuative terms with mass terms. From Wordnik.com. [Sortals] Reference
Turning to set theory and then the rest of science, Quine goes on to argue that, although stipulative definition, what he calls. From Wordnik.com. [The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction] Reference
As Quine (1960, 220) put it, “there is no breaking out of the intentional vocabulary by explaining its members in other terms”. From Wordnik.com. [Intentionality] Reference
(Davidson has also referred to it as the principle of ˜rational accommodation™) a version of which is also to be found in Quine. From Wordnik.com. [Donald Davidson] Reference
According to Quine, speakers 'behavioral dispositions constrain what can be plausibly said about how to best regiment their language. From Wordnik.com. [Logical Form] Reference
Quine (1951) abandoned two-tiered, neo-Kantian accounts that attempt to factor out the human contribution to cognition from nature's. From Wordnik.com. [Scientific Revolutions] Reference
Quine was self-consciously going against the grain when he rejected the higher flights of set theory on scientific grounds (1986, 400). From Wordnik.com. [Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics] Reference
Such work probably gave him greater satisfaction than the thriller Mirage (1965) or being reunited with Quine on the glossy Hotel (1967). From Wordnik.com. [Kevin McCarthy obituary] Reference
Quine (1960) further supported his case by sketching a full-fledged theory of language that does without any theory of determinate meaning. From Wordnik.com. [The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction] Reference
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