Here the analogy is to the eyesight veridically seeing something.    From Wordnik.com.  [Mohist Canons] Reference

G-experiences veridically represent redness, rather than non-veridically representing greenness.    From Wordnik.com.  [The Contents of Perception] Reference

For example a subject might veridically perceive a table in front of him while hallucinating a pink rat on top of it.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

This factive mental state can only obtain when one is veridically perceiving the world, and it cannot obtain when one is hallucinating.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

However, what they deny is that such a kind K is the fundamental kind of mental event occurring when a subject veridically perceives the world.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

Moreover, since these experiences have intentional content, they have accuracy conditions: they can be correct or incorrect; they can veridically represent or misrepresent.    From Wordnik.com.  [Pain] Reference

Whether or not that is assigning "blame," as Greg denies it was intended to do, it certainly assigns causation, in a way that I find just empirically, veridically incorrect.    From Wordnik.com.  [Hillary Hits Critics For Taking Her RFK Assassination Remarks "Out Of Context"] Reference

They might then hold that this layer of existential content, which is present in experience whether or not one is veridically perceiving the world, provides a common mental factor for veridical and hallucinatory experiences.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

If one accepts that the same kind of conscious experience occurs in all three cases, then this imposes a constraint on the account one can give of the kind of mental event that occurs when one veridically perceives the world.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

Another perceiver, call him Invert, typically has R-experiences when he veridically perceives and is in causal contact with green things, and has G-experiences when he veridically perceives and is in causal contact with red things.    From Wordnik.com.  [The Contents of Perception] Reference

On this formulation, the disjunctivist is committed to denying that whatever fundamental kind of mental event occurs when one is veridically perceiving the world, that kind of event can occur whether or not one is veridically perceiving.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

So this version of the causal argument can accommodate the disjunctivist's claim that there are significant non-causal conditions necessary for the occurrence of the kind of experience that occurs when one veridically perceives the world.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

The proponent of this modified causal argument claims that there are no non-causal conditions necessary for the occurrence of the kind of experience that occurs when one hallucinates that cannot also obtain when one veridically perceives the world.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

According to an epistemological disjunctivist when you veridically perceive the world you have available to you perceptual evidence about the mind-independent world which isn't available to you when have a subjectively indistinguishible hallucination.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

In making out, or trying to make out what it is that we are confronted with, we may go wrong, and make false judgements, but when we are misled in this way, this is not because our senses non-veridically represent to us that the world is a certain way.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

After running through this humorous vein, he told me what adventures he had seen since joining the filibuster army; which, however, I have no intention to recount; -- honor enough, if I may relate veridically, and with passable phrase, my own tamer befallings.    From Wordnik.com.  [The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 04, No. 26, December, 1859] Reference

On the assumption that experiences with the same color phenomenology will have the same color content, this thought experiment challenges the simple theory we began with, since it purports to describe a case in which a G-experience is an experience of veridically seeing red.    From Wordnik.com.  [The Contents of Perception] Reference

For example, the model in the Burger & Lande paper, cited above as a counter-example to the claims that fitness cannot “veridically” be computed in a way that references the global optimum, is only intended to capture some aspects of stabilizing and directional selection.    From Wordnik.com.  [Evolution of "Hello World" using random mutation and selection - The Panda's Thumb] Reference

John Campbell (2002a, 2002b, 2005) has argued that there is an important connection between the nature of the conscious perceptual experience that occurs when we veridically perceive the world and our ability to think demonstratively about the mind-independent objects that we perceive.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

Since this naïve realist account of phenomenal character cannot be applied to hallucination, those who propose it are committed to the claim that the kind of phenomenally conscious episode that occurs when one veridically perceives the world does not occur when one is hallucinating.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

Moreover, according to this view, the epistemic difference between a veridical perception and a subjectively indistinguishible hallucination is not to be explained by simply citing factors that are external to the subjective experiential state one is in when one veridically perceives the world.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

They suggest that one may hold a naïve realist view according to which mind-independent objects, such as tables and trees, are constituents of the experience one has when one veridically perceives the world, without being committed to a further claim about what the essence of such episodes consists in.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

They also note that naïve realism is often motivated by phenomenological considerations, and they question whether introspective reflection on the phenomenology of the experience one has when one veridically perceives the world puts one in a position to learn anything about the essence of the experience one is having.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

Along related lines, Sturgeon (1998) suggests that the disjunctivist who denies that it is possible to provide a positive account of the phenomenal character of a hallucination does not have the resources to explain adequately how it is that having a hallucination of an F can provide one with positive knowledge concerning what it is like to veridically perceive an F.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

Those advocating this form of disjunctivism place emphasis on the idea that when one veridically perceives the world one has a distinctive form of epistemic contact with the mind-independent world, and one's experience provides one with grounds for making knowledgeable perceptual judgements about the mind-independent world that would be lacking if one were merely hallucinating.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

Hinton argued that we should understand a statement about how things sensorily appear to a subject to be equivalent to a disjunctive statement that either one is veridically perceiving such and such or one is suffering an illusion (or hallucination); and such statements are not to be regarded as making a report about a distinctive mental event or state that is common to these disjoint situations.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

The suggestion is that one can accept the claim that there is an epistemically distinguished category of experiential state that can only obtain when one veridically perceives the world, and yet one can consistently maintain that it is also possible to identify a kind of perceptual state, of which some positive account can be given, which can obtain whether one is veridically perceiving the world, or merely having a subjectively indistinguishible hallucination.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

Shapes are perceived veridically -- perceived as they really are in the physical world, regardless of the orientation from which they are viewed.    From Wordnik.com.  [ebookshare] Reference

He explores the manner in which people are able to represent themselves when the physical constraints of body and veridically-rendered behaviors are removed.    From Wordnik.com.  [Berkman Center Newsfeed] Reference

The pro-illusion folk (Jesse Prinz was in this camp) argued that when you attend to something you represent that thing more veridically and so the condition where one fixates and attends to the center is illusionary (Jesse preferred 'distorted').    From Wordnik.com.  [Brains] Reference

Of course, that’s a ridiculous set of numbers, since the probability calculations do not veridically map the phenomena.    From Wordnik.com.  [Behe Blows It (in other news, dog bites man) - The Panda's Thumb] Reference

Similar considerations may apply in the case of experiences that we might describe as partial hallucinations ” cases in which a subject hallucinates an object while veridically perceiving other aspects of his environment.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

According to this relational view of experience, when you veridically perceive the world the mind-independent objects and properties you perceive are constituents of your conscious experience ” the qualitative character of the conscious experience you undergo is constituted by the qualitative characters of the mind-independent items you perceive.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

˜naïve realism about phenomenal character™), when one veridically perceives the world, the mind-independent items perceived, such as tables and trees and the properties they manifest to one when perceived, partly constitute one's conscious experience, and hence determine its phenomenal character.    From Wordnik.com.  [Petty Injuries] Reference

(veridically) in our visual space as two.    From Wordnik.com.  [Kant and Leibniz] Reference