If a quale is a representatum, then it is represented under a mode of presentation, and modes of presentation may be narrow even when the representational content itself is wide.    From Wordnik.com.  [Representational Theories of Consciousness] Reference

(But as previously mentioned, it turns out that Rey's theory is not a theory of qualia in the strict first-order sense of "quale" used here; see Section 4.5.).    From Wordnik.com.  [Representational Theories of Consciousness] Reference

These subjective conscious experiences are called "quale," plural "qualia," another good word for showing off your philosophy knowledge.    From Wordnik.com.  [Planet Atheism] Reference

Non sono sicuro di quale sia la storia: Robinson Crusoe?.    From Wordnik.com.  [No Fat Clips!!! : David: Opening Sequence] Reference

The content is an inherent particular quality, a kind of quale.    From Wordnik.com.  [Salvation Santa] Reference

Relation; nor again need “passive,” if “patient” is a quale.    From Wordnik.com.  [The Six Enneads.] Reference

In that case, the soul must be a quantum and a quale and a substance.    From Wordnik.com.  [On the Soul] Reference

But what sort of story is possible in the case of awareness of a quale?.    From Wordnik.com.  [The Identity Theory of Mind] Reference

But how would a distinctive quale even imaginably undergo such a shift?.    From Wordnik.com.  [Representational Theories of Consciousness] Reference

Don Alfonso el dì va a piacere in diversi loci come giovene; il quale, dice S.    From Wordnik.com.  [Lucretia Borgia According to Original Documents and Correspondence of Her Day] Reference

It seems to follow that the rose that looks red to me is (partially) composed of a red quale.    From Wordnik.com.  [Neutral Monism] Reference

The quale, the greenness of the blob, is (like the blob itself) a nonactual intentional object.    From Wordnik.com.  [Representational Theories of Consciousness] Reference

Pure representationalism would be the view that representation is all it takes to make a quale.    From Wordnik.com.  [Representational Theories of Consciousness] Reference

(Since spectrum inversion is rife, their use of ˜QR™ is not associated with any particular quale.).    From Wordnik.com.  [Inverted Qualia] Reference

A quale can be thought of as the distinctive phenomenal property of an apparent phenomenal individual.    From Wordnik.com.  [Representational Theories of Consciousness] Reference

Thus, in both cases, there is a constituent experience that is the real bearer of the relevant quale or qualia.    From Wordnik.com.  [Qualia] Reference

Adversus nubes ceruleae, quale jabar iridis, fair, foul, and full of variation, though most part irksome and bad.    From Wordnik.com.  [Anatomy of Melancholy] Reference

But in such a case, there is a good sense in which it would not be like anything for the subject to experience that quale.    From Wordnik.com.  [Representational Theories of Consciousness] Reference

For example, if a representation of red is of a serious character, it has a perceptual look because a red-quale is involved.    From Wordnik.com.  [Salvation Santa] Reference

Does it follow that whenever alteration proceeds from Quality, it will be activity and Action, the quale remaining impassive?.    From Wordnik.com.  [The Six Enneads.] Reference

In fact, since this second "what it's like" is itself a property of the quale, it cannot very well be identical with the quale.    From Wordnik.com.  [Representational Theories of Consciousness] Reference

Thus, for the essence of fire we must look to the Reason-Principle; what produces the visible aspect is, properly speaking, a quale.    From Wordnik.com.  [The Six Enneads.] Reference

Once we have this theory, we are able reinterpret the quale as mental states and claim that they are caused by the physical objects.    From Wordnik.com.  [Alfred Jules Ayer] Reference

First, a quale can be described in one's public natural language, while what it is like to experience the quale seems to be ineffable.    From Wordnik.com.  [Representational Theories of Consciousness] Reference

Dretske (1996) maintains that there is nothing intrinsic to the brain that constitutes the difference between a red quale and a green one.    From Wordnik.com.  [Representational Theories of Consciousness] Reference

A point for consideration is how the quale, as conditioned by Quality, can belong to the same category: obviously there can be no single genus embracing both.    From Wordnik.com.  [The Six Enneads.] Reference